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CREATIVE REFORM THROUGH 
POLITICS 
THE IMPORTANCE OF GOVERNMENT 
In the Bible the government, more than any other human agency, 
is given responsibility for justice. The first task of government is 
to ensure the basic rights of living in community. In this way love 
promotes the good of every person. 
God has granted specific powers to individuals and institutions 
within society, which serve as instruments of God's sovereignty for 
the benefit of human life and as barriers against tyranny, chaos, 
and disorder.' One of these agents of power to which special au- 
thority is given is the government. Power created by God for good 
is perverted by the selfishness of individuals and groups that strug- 
gle for power over one another; in this context the state is author- 
ized by God to "bear the sword" (Rom. 13.4). Force may be used 
to protect the innocent and punish those who prey upon them. 
Likewise, it is God's instrument for the maintenance of order2 and 
the securing of justice in society (Rom. 13; 1 Pet. 2). 
The ruler is the servant of God for the good of the people 
(Rom. 13.4). The content of this good (to agathon) needs to be 
understood in light of the Hellenistic Jewish understanding of the 
ruler as father and shepherd of the people and the Old Testament 
view of the king as the one who feeds the people in justice by 
seeking the lost, bringing back the strayed, binding up the crip- 
pled, strengthening the weak, and watching over the fat and 
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strong (Ezek. 34.3-4, 15-16, 23-24). Throughout the ancient 
Near East, justice was a royal function. Thus God, in the context 
of the divine attribute of justice, could be addressed as a king. 
Mighty King, lover of justice, thou hast established equity, thou 
has executed justice and righteousness to Jacob. (Ps. 99.4, RSV) 
The ideal earthly ruler is characterized as one who carries out jus- 
tice and in particular defends the cause of the oppressed (Ps. 72.1- 
4). Even pagan monarchs are commanded to exercise such justice 
(Dan. 4.27). The state, when it is obedient to God, advances the 
welfare of its citizens through laws which contribute to "freedom 
and br~ therhood" ;~  if the state is disobedient, it voids its God- 
given responsibility and threatens the welfare of its citizens. Atten- 
tion to the activity of government thus follows from Christian con- 
cern for welfare and j ~ s t i c e . ~  Calvin reflected the biblical perspec- 
tive when he taught that civil rulers should "exhibit a kind of 
image of the Divine Providence, guardianship, goodness, benevo- 
lence, and justice. " ' 
The far-reaching institutionalized benevolence characteristic of 
biblical justice, with its connection to the ruler, stands in contrast 
to a historical theme in American political thought in which the 
power of the state figures primarily a threat to freedom. Accord- 
ingly, some would restrict the activities of the state to maintaining 
security of the borders and to such limited functions as the enforce- 
ment of contracts and protection against physical violence, theft, 
and fraud. Christian realism about the tendency toward evil in 
individuals and in groups will question the practicability of leaving 
significant areas of social relations without a higher authority. 
Biblical thought is quite aware of oppressive forces against which 
the government must act. In an industrial society such forces ap- 
pear in groups holding concentrated economic and social power 
and in environmental factors such as disease and hunger. Here jus- 
tice often requires an expanded role for the state. Objections to 
civil rights legislation on grounds of "states' rights," or objections 
to taxation for support of basic social programs, bring to mind 
Bishop Francis McConnell's observation about "the absurdity of 
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raising small problems of coercion when the necessity of providing 
against a more general coercion is upon us."6 
Although the state continues as servant of God, it b e l m  to 
_the fallen order of society., Unjust laws and corruption in govern- 
ment participate in the reality of social evil. The government, like 
- 
other spheres of social life, is the scene of the struggle between the 
fallen worldly powers and the authority of God for the control of 
the  human community. Two value systems are in conflict. W e  are 
to "battle for God's intention" over the powers and "against their 
corruption."' This charge has a political dimension. W e  either 
passively acquiesce in the activity of the government, even though 
that  activity is contrary to God's will, or we refuse political sub- 
jection to the powers by struggling for justice "in the gate," as the 
Scriptures command (Amos 5.15; cf. Zech. 8.16). 
The political task receives a new dynamic with the Reign of 
God breaking into history. The new social order that God is cre- 
ating intermingles with and acts upon and against the old order, 
which it will someday replace. Such a theological motif enabled 
the Puritans to become the first group in history to understand 
that one could intentionally and organizationally make changes in 
one's community.8 The Puritans combined their passion for the 
sovereignty of God over all of life with the conviction that the 
fruits of conversion were relevant to the reconstruction of the social 
order. Against the traditional conservative view that intentional 
changes interfere with the natural order of things, the Puritans 
perceived history as a degeneration, arrested only by the interven- 
tion of God. Historical precedent does not prevent required 
change; Scripture and reason are sufficient. God, not history, i? 
sovereign. Consequently, Thomas Case could proclaim, "Reform 
the university . . . reform the cities . . . the countries . . . the 
ordinances . . . the worship of God. . . . Every plant that my 
heavenly Father hath not planted shall be rooted up."9 
Some contemporary Christians allow the necessity of the gov- 
ernment's authority, yet argue that they cannot be involved in that 
process because the Christian is under a higher ethical standard 
with which the coercive role of the state is incompatible. For some, 
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the basic text excluding Christian participation in politics is Mark 
10.42-43 (Matt. 20.2S261Luke 2 2 . 2 S 2 6 ) :  
You know that those who are supposed to rule over the Gentiles 
lord it over them, and their great men exercise authority over 
them. But it shall not be so among you; but whoever would be 
great among you must be your servant. (RSV) 
One interpretation of this text can be that there is something basic 
to the Christian ethic which is contrary to the meaning of the 
state, and that the purpose of the state is to lord it over others, to 
tyrannize. 
Jesus refers his teaching in this passage to relationships among 
the disciples ("among you," repeated twice). The things here ob- 
served of secular government are not to characterize the voluntary 
Christian community. While Jesus does not suggest the applica- 
tion of this teaching to the conduct of the state, the standard for 
the C h ~ k t i a n  community will create a critical awareness in evalu- 
ating analogous functions in the political community. 
But what is actually said about the state? The rendering "lord 
i t  over" is a misinterpretation. The Greek term (katakyrietlein) is 
not an intensive usage; it carries no suggestion of arrogance or 
oppression but simply means "to rule over, to be lord over."'0 I t  
is not true that the passage equates political coercion with tyranny 
or the abuse of power. Jesus is referring to the fact that there is a 
hierarchy of authority in the state which is not to be repeated 
within the Christian community. 
As i t  appears in Luke, this saying has an added point: "Their 
authorities are called 'benefactors' " (Luke 22.25). The term bene- 
factor (etlergetis) was an honorific title given in gratitude to a human 
or divine benefactor. I t  was a sought-after title of very high status. 
A grateful recipient of benefaction who bestowed this title ac- 
knowledged his or her inferior position by so doing. The term 
belongs to a status system which, though highly developed in the 
Greek and Roman world, is nonetheless not an essential or univer- 
sal aspect of the state. This extension of status went so far that 
such terms as benefactor served as central expressions of the "bene- 
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factor cult," through which a community honored its human ben- 
efactors with sacrifices and other religious honors otherwise re- 
served for divine benefactors." It is noteworthy that the 
designation which in the Lukan account is associated with the fact 
of rule connotes status, rather than use of force. In the Christian 
community there must not be such distinctions of rank. 
The contexts supplied for this saying of Jesus by the Gospels 
support the contention that the teaching primarily concerns status, 
- - 
rather than authority. In the Markan tradition, the context is the 
request of James and John to receive positions of highest honor in 
Christ's coming rule (Mark 10.35-41/Matt. 20.20-24). The say- 
ing refers specifically to the one who desires to be great (nzegas) or 
first (P~it'ot"), both terms of rank and dignity (Mark 10.43-441Matt. 
20.26-27).12 The desire for status is condemned. 
The Lukan account places this saying at a later point in the 
ministry of Jesus. The context is simply a dispute among the dis- 
ciples about who would be the greatest (megas, Luke 22.24). They 
are told that the ruler or leader (ho higournenos) will appear as the 
servant (Luke 22.26); the function of authority exists in the com- 
munity, but carries with it no superiority in status. 
In both these accounts, Jesus alludes to the rulers of the Gen- 
tiles in order to condemn not the power of authority as such, but 
mther t of seeking to be elevated above others. It is not 
the fact of rule that is proscribed, 
thority. - The function of authority is an acceptable inequality in- 
sofar as it is of service to everyone, but i t  does not carry any ;m- 
plication of superior dignity or worth. 
These passages, when applied by analogy to the political com- 
mu nit^ will not prevent the Christian from participating in the 
decision-m_akingprocesses of government. They should, however, 
sensitize_-one to the temptations of political power for personal 
p d u m d ~ ~ ~ e r l ~ r l t  y . 
The other means to justice-evangelism, the Christian com- 
munity, strategic noncooperation, and even revolution-are com- 
pleted by legislation. Political reform is a normal path to social 
change; only in the breakdown of this process must recourse be 
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had to the use of nonviolent coercion or, most exceptionally, to 
justified armed revolution. 
THE LIMITS OF POLITICS 
Many who at first appear particularly hostile to the legislation of 
social change are, upon further examination, seen to oppose not 
political reform itself but, one, an excessive dependence upon re- 
r two, the use of excessive power in reform. x Wit  respect to the first concern, they are rightly critical of 
such heavy reliance upon political and economic means to deal 
with social evil that political action becomes the principal thrust 
of the church in society. While seeking external controls to resolve 
. . 
s o c ~ a l  gmbkms,we-m-a~come to ne?- of C o f n  
,mission. Qeatjye reform must be onlv one in a sDectrum of means 
to iustiqe. 
Not only is a preoccupation with reforming the legal structure 
of society unfaithful to the full responsibility of Christian life and 
mission, but as a consequence it also fails to nurture the vital forces 
that can make genuine reform a historical reality. In a democratic 
society the institutions of government can improve but little on 
the general morality and values of the community at large.13 The 
effectiveness of a law depends in large part upon the ability of 
voluntary associations, such as religious and educational institu- 
tions, to lead and mold public opinion.14 The person in office, 
much of whose energy is spent on the maintenance of society and 
on staying in office, needs the creative support of those out of 
government, who are free from these obligations. l 5  The Christian 
drive for social righteousness needs to be present in both spheres. 
The legislative and judicial processes promoting social justice, 
though vitally important, are only the tip of the iceberg. A just 
and humane society can exist only because its people possess such 
qualities as self-respect and self-acceptance, tolerance, mutual re- 
spect, unselfishness, honesty, the sense of right and duty, the de- 
sire for equal treatment, and fidelity to law. Law itself is more 
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than a system of regulations; it embodies many of these same qual- 
ities, which constitute the indispensable foundation of every legal 
order. It is important that the content of legal regulations encourage 
the growth of these values. The creation of these values, however, 
must come about through associations distinct from the state; the 
formation of these values should not, and indeed cannot, be subject 
to governmental control. Inattention to these ethical, even reli- 
gious, dimensions of order can deprive justice of its capacity to 
survive. Politics alone will not suffice to elicit or instill such val- 
ues. Evangelism and Christian community do contribute to the 
process, even when only indirectly through a leavening effect in 
society. l 6  
The abuse of power in reform movements has also been rightly 
protested. Although the advance of justice requires support from 
political authority, Christians must always be mindful that, as 
Reinhold Niebuhr warned, power easily becomes the tool of the 
will-to-power, the sinful need to have power over others. The very 
corruptions which make the use of power necessary for achieving 
justice may infect the reformers themselves. 
It is essential, in the attempt to combat evil and to advance 
righteousness by means of legislation, to distinguish between those 
actions which impose necessary restrictions on others in order to 
further the welfare of the neighbor, and those actions which stem 
from a will-to-power and the desire to dominate others. The goal 
must not be to gain power for oneself in the interest of attaining 
one's own objectives, but rather to empower others.17 
Christian efforts for just legislation will find expression in 
democratic processes rather than in change dictated from above, 
which circumvents participation from below. Social processes that 
involve each person in the decisions which personally affect him 
or her have a dual theological basis: on the one hand, the impulse 
of love, which demands respect for every person, and on the other, 
the imperative to oppose the abuse that arises from the unchecked 
power of one person over another, which is one symptom of human 
depravity. Participatory democracy can be focused upon a cen- 
tralized or a decentralized administration, depending upon the par- 
ticular social and political situation. In recent cases of civil rights 
law it has been centralized administration which has most often 
imdlemented justice and freedom. Centralization and decentraliza- 
tion do not involve basic principles of justice, however, but are 
variables to be used to promote social good, particularly for disad- 
vantaged minorities. 
Should one attempt to coerce adherence to Christian values? 
One writer sees little difference between forcing all citizens to be 
"their brothers' keepers" and the use of taxes to support preach- 
ing.'' There are three things to be considered: the commands of 
Scripture, the criteria for Christian political decision-making, and 
the types of duties that are subject to legislation. 
The Christian must be concerned about legislating the duties 
arising from responsibility for members of the community because 
Scripture teaches that the care of the needy is a matter of justice 
and therefore an obligation upon the whole. 
The Christian must be guided by Christian values and duties 
in his or her participation in politics. What other set of values 
could guide a Christian? "Which morality" is what much of poli- 
tics is about; behind the dispute in political issues lies disagree- 
ment about ethical values.'g Christians with a sense of the sover- 
eignty of God should not be reticent about the social necessity for 
their standard of justice. "Nobody in all the world is more quali- 
fied for political action than the child of God."20 
But as we have indicated, work for justice is to be carried out 
through democratic processes. It is not a matter of the imposition 
of a minority's will (with the attendant necessity of endless re- 
straints). If Christian ideals are to be embodied in the regulations 
of a secular society like the United States, the process will need 
support from non-Christians. Christian reform is advanced by the 
fact that, while we do not live in a Christian society, neither do 
we live in a pagan society without any Christian heritage. Ours is 
a semi-Christian society, which has been influenced by past and 
present leavening of Christian influence, and in which Judeo-Chris- 
tian social values are often advanced with more vigor by non- 
believers than by many believers. But whether one is with the 
majority or not, one can work democratically only from one's own 
social outlook. A pluralistic society would become sterile if all tra- 
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ditions were reduced to the least common denominator. How then 
does one deal with a question such as racism or slavery? Could one 
countenance a refusal to work for laws which would reflect the 
Christian ideal in such a situation? Would one back off from sanc- 
tions on slave masters in the name offreedom from coercion? 
Yet the question of freedom is relevant because not all matters 
of right are appropriate for legislation. Legislation deals with mat- 
ters of justice; it deals with matters which substantially involve 
rights. Legislation is also appropriate in order to regulate actions 
which may cause harm to individuals or to institutions; it does not 
pertain to private matters that do not either interfere with the 
well-being of another or diminish the well-being of the community 
as a whole. 
Legislation is also not appropriately used to give special advan- 
tage to a private group, such as a church. Merely cultic values 
must not be imposed. Such coercion was part of the defect of the 
Constantinianism of the medieval Corpus Christianum, in which the 
state and the church formed one whole, each using the other for 
its own ends.2' Payment of preachers' salaries by the state would 
be an obvious act of Constantinianism; there is a long democratic 
tradition which would distinguish that practice from legislating 
community responsibilities for the needy. 
CREATIVE O R  COOPTABLE REFORM 
The kind of reform rightly condemned by many who are searching 
for action to deal with the basic problems of a society is a cooptable 
type of reform; slight improvements are proposed to deal with 
what are in fact the fundamental problems of the society.22 The 
changes which are sought and allowed are only those compatible 
with the preservation of the present social and economic system. 
The needs of the system determine which actions are rational, prac- 
tical, and possible.23 The assumption is that the system is funda- 
mentally sound.24 The situation of the people may be improved, 
but no real alternatives to the present power relationships are con- 
sidered. 
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Constantinianism lends itself to such palliative reform through 
the mutual approval and support of church and state, in its old 
form, or in the current secular version, between the church and 
"the establishment." In this relationship the church cannot preach 
judgment on the selfish purposes at the heart of society without 
condemning its own role in that society. The ethics taught are 
those which are feasible within the limits of the acceptance of the 
established society . 2 5  
The short-term cooptable perspective has characterized some of 
the reform movements which have received the most attention in 
our century. Many struggles to correct disproportionate economic 
power have resulted in the appointment of independent regulating 
commissions, to cite a leading example. The hope of many was 
that a commission would serve as an effective watchdog to protect 
the public interest from the industry regulated. Yet the regulating 
commissions become the captive of the industry to be regulated. 
In the Progressive reforms of the period 1900-19 16 the very form 
of the regulating legislation was usually proposed by the industry 
involved.26 The typical regulating commission goes through a life 
cycle of increasing control by the industry. As public and congres- 
sional attention is withdrawn after the creation of the commission, 
the agency drops its police role and begins to play more the role 
of a manager of an industry. It is accepted and supported as an 
essential part of the industry, providing stability and predictabil- 
ity. The attitude toward the public interest becomes one of passiv- 
ity and cold neutrality. The close relations with the industry and 
the narrow definition of its activities hamper the commission from 
even discerning the public interest.27 
But the discouraging history of regulating commissions was to 
be expected from the nature of the reforms. Gabriel Kolko argues 
that the reforms of the Progressive period were prototypical of the 
regulating reforms which followed. They were founded on the as- 
sumption of the soundness of the basic patterns of property rela- 
tionships in the American economy. No serious alternatives to the 
actual power in the hands of economic elites were proposed for 
organizing society.2H What has been sought is not a reordering of 
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economic relationships but the elimination of flagrant abuses.29 
When the commissions dealt with the abuses and then became 
spokespersons for the industry, they were only fulfilling their 
original purpose of aiding the continuation of the established sys- 
tem of business, minus the practices that exposed it to serious 
public c r i t i ~ i s m . ~ '  Such reformers, operating in the "genteel tradi- 
tion of middle-class reform" and lacking a deep conviction of the 
reality of economic evil, hope to modify basic economic institu- 
tions by "tinkering with the machinery of government."3' 
Similar observations need to be made about the palliative pro- 
grams of the 1960s, disappointment with which has led to a "neo- 
conservative" movement of reaction to governmental reform. As 
Michael Harrington has argued, despite the claims by the govern- 
ment and the fears of the conservatives, the Great Society programs 
never included a pervasive governmental intrusion into the private 
sphere. Nor was there a massive trend toward equality in the 
1960s. The programs were oversold and ~ n d e r f i n a n c e d . ~ ~  Not 
their prodigality, but their lack of a radical innovative character 
has contributed to the developing urban struggle between the 
have-nots and the have-littles. I t  is not governmental generosity 
which has created the incentive for recipients of welfare programs 
to remain de~endent .  but the timiditv of government and the fail- 
ure of a full-employment One can say of the whole cli- 
mate of protest in the 1960s that the focus was upon a more open 
society in policy formulation and social movement with only pe- 
ripheral concern to economic institutions and economic power.3" 
But there is another type of reform. It is built on the premise 
that many social changes, even revolutionary changes, come only 
through a cumulative series of partial steps.35 Here the reformer's 
goals are dissonant with the current social structures, but he or she 
recognizes that these goals cannot be achieved all at once. One 
accepts concrete solutions to specific problems but only on prem- 
ises that question the assumptions of the present order and only as 
leading in the general direction of a new order. The Christian re- 
former first of all has a vision of the new order of the Reign of 
God but also realizes that the Reign will be only partially realiz- 
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able in history. The Christian also operates with a vision of a com- 
munity in history which is not the Reign of God but which is 
more proximate to the Reign than is the present society. Specific 
reforms are advanced as they reflect the ultimate and the historical 
vision. 
Creative reforms are addressed particularly to those changes 
which modify power relationships, set forth a new order of priori- 
ties, and provide new models of life and culture." They are 
changes which limit the power of those currently holding dispro- 
portionate power, which make the weak more aware of their hu- 
man rights, and which grant the poor and members of the working 
class (both in capitalism and in state socialism) more control over 
their lives. 
In creative reform the limits of what is possible are redefined 
so as not to reflect the needs, criteria, and rationales of the present 
way of doing things but rather what should be made possible in 
terms of human needs. 37 
But what should be possible often only becomes reality piece- 
meal. I have found John Yoder's strategy in an Anabaptist per- 
spective helpful for models of Christian political reform which re- 
flect more direct participation of Christians in the political process. 
There is a disparity between the demands of God and what is po- 
litically possible, between a Christian ethic dependent upon regen- 
. - 
eration and its political expression, particularly in a secular state. 
Thus what is sought through creative reform cannot be the elimi- 
nation of all evil or even the immediate structuring of a new social 
order. Rather the political strategy is to seek changes toward what 
should be made possible by concentrating upon identifiable con- 
crete problems of justice which are capable of being dealt with at 
present. The greatest possible step toward the desired restructuring 
of society is what is always required for creative r e f ~ r m . ~ "  
W e  have no grounds for great optimism about the possibility 
of far-reaching political reform. It is difficult to see the possibility 
of wholesale radical structural changes. Yet the "neoconservative" 
counsel of diminished ~ u b l i c  intervention in our economic and so- 
. . .  . 
sia1 problems is not the answer, for such & IS a r n ~ l c ~ ,  nnr 
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W s  in the reformist posture. There are no 
easy answers but "there are some solutions to some of our prob- 
lems." 3"mall victories are important, especially as they advance 
toward what should be possible. One must evaluate political 
change in the light of the difficulty of creating change at any level 
- 
of human behavior. In considering political possibilities, we should 
remember that the security possessed by individuals and major seg- 
ments of our society rides the crest of past political struggles to 
distribute power and the fruits of technology. 
The short-sighted perspective on reform, which does not con- 
front the gravity of the problems of the current system, leads to 
short-run efforts. Some of the failures of reform have been due to 
a lack of vigilance on the part of the reformers. This failure, for 
example, has been damaging in the history of the regulatory com- 
missions, where once regulation is legislated the reformers takq 
what they view as an earned rest and fail to provide sustained vig- 
- - 
ilance over the administration of the regulation.40 In the time of 
Lincoln Steffens Philadelphia was regarded as the worst-governed 
city in the country, but it reflected a condition which followed 
reform: "Reform with us is usually revolt, not government, and is 
soon over."41 Bishop Francis J .  McConnell once said, "The trouble 
is not that we don't get mad but that we don't stay mad."42 
"Never settle for winning," warns Dieter Hessel. 43 More should 
- 
be expected from those with the Christian perspective of human 
society and the Christian grounds for concern. 
YOU CAN'T LEGISLATE MORALITY? 
Our  view of human nature and of history makes us aware that we 
cannot guarantee or assume sufficient personal morality to control 
injustice in society. Wha t  then are we to do? One answer is en- 
forceable law. Can morality be achieved through the legal process? 
A frequently heard answer is the slogan, "You can't legislate mo- 
rality." This phrase is applied by many to matters of private activ- 
ity or consumption that do not harm the well-being of others: in 
such cases legislation is indeed futile. Others, however, aware that 
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morality extends to matters of justice and rights, hold legislation 
to be futile in such matters as well. It is to this attitude that we 
would respond. 
There are two aspects to morality. One aspect is subjective- 
our dispositions, intentions, even perceptions; it would appear dif- 
ficult to legislate subjective morality. But the other aspect of mo- 
rality is objective-ur external behavior. Biblical ethics gives con- 
siderable space to regulating external actions, and social policy is 
more concerned with objective behavior. For social policy, tangible 
justice is more important than intangible love (although the high- 
est standard is the presence and interconnection of both). Harvey 
Cox wrote several years ago: 
The recent civil rights revolution in America has proved at least 
one thing: Negroes are not so much interested in winning whites 
to a less prejudiced attitude as they are in preventing them from 
enforcing the prejudice they do have. The Negro revolt is not 
aimed at winning friends but at winning freedom, not interper- 
sonal warmth but institutional justice. . . . The inmates of the 
urban concentration camp do not long for fraternization with the 
guards; what they want is the abolition of the prison; not im- 
proved relations with the captors but "release from ~ a p t i v i t ~ . " ~ "  
External actions can be legally controlled and motivated 45 even 
though inner motivations cannot. The slogan "YOU can't legislate 
morality" is often used to offer a rationale for government to do 
nothing; but governments always regulate public behavior, and the 
great majority of our laws are attempts to control human behav- 
i ~ r . ~ ~  
Law, however, also has an impact upon the subjective aspects 
of morality. Law has an educative factor. I t  communicates a stan- 
dard of right which can function through the superego. Law can 
legitimate morality. Law also has a conditioning factor. Virtues are 
. , 
habits, and habits are formed by doing similar acts over a period 
of time. The habits that are formed from youth do make a differ- 
cncc. One can promote public behavior by encouraging the desired 
& - A -- - -- --- 
~ d u e s  legally. 
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This is confirmed by what happens in the ci ty states. For the 
lawmakers make the citizens do good by forming good habits in 
them and certainly this is the will of every lawmaker; and those 
who do not will miss the mark. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 
1 lO3b. 2 4 )  
This viewpoint taken without qualification runs the risk of over- 
reliance upon law (cf. pp. 197-98), but i t  is generally correct. 
One cannot in this way make new creatures, but one can affect 
character in ways that are socially perceptible. One can make a 
better society even if not a wholly well society. 
Coerced actions have an impact even upon basic values, percep- 
tions, and attitudes. A case in point is the effects of the creative 
civil rights legislation and judicial decisions in recent United 
States history. Surveys at the University of Alabama from the time 
of its forced desegregation in 1963 until 1969 showed an increas- 
ing acceptance of blacks. There was a growing willingness to in- 
clude blacks with whites in activities over which the general soci- 
ety was in conflict, such as worship and travel. O n  campus there 
was less reluctance to include blacks in activities involving close 
relationships with whites. Traits traditionally associated with 
blacks were viewed more positively and stereotypes were falling. 
There was growing support of blacks having political and economic 
equality with whites. The student majority in 1963 accepted the 
"separate but equal" doctrine. The student majority in 1969 ap- 
proved desegregation. In 1969 the majority had not yet accepted 
social desegregation (rooming with blacks, double-dating, mixed 
dating), but there were strong trends in that direction.47 
Robert Coles studied the attitudes of Southern white teachers 
in desegregated schools. Many found that their sentiments about 
desegregation were changed by the experience of having to teach 
black children. One said, 
At first he was a Negro, then he became just another pupil. I'm 
not against him, though I still feel loyal to the way we've always 
lived down here. It's two different problems, you know.48 
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There are still tensions, but feelings are being conditioned even by 
compulsory experiences. The new attitudes are becoming part of 
the way of life to which people later will come to feel some loyalty. 
The impact of civil rights legislation upon a locality has been 
carefully examined in a model political essay by Frederick Wir t .  I t  
is an interesting, well-written work based on impeccable research 
in Panola County, Mississippi. National law and national law en- 
forcement were instruments of change in voter registration, 
schools, and economic rights. There is no evidence that there 
would have been significant change without such enforcement. In 
1960 two-thirds of the black population earned less than $2,000. 
Only one black could vote. Except as private household workers, 
blacks earned less than whites in every occupation. Expenditure for 
black pupils was one-half to one-third of that for white pupils; 
almost two-thirds of the blacks received no more than six years of 
education. That law enforcement was effective was due in a large 
part to the role played by the Justice Department in the 1960s in 
litigation, overcoming the breakdown in the adversary system, in 
which the white lawyer out-weighed his black opponent in power 
and status and the judge was connected with the interests of the 
whites. In 1967, 3 ,500 blacks (50 percent of those eligible) were 
registered to vote. Their votes were being sought by white candi- 
dates. There were gravelled roads to black homes for the first time 
in memory. The local press had more and better coverage of the 
black community. Official violence had been curbed. There was 
little impact in the area of economic rights, e .g . ,  employment 
needs. The legislation was palliative here; the federal programs met 
symptoms and did not deal with the roots of the problem. While 
perception of blacks had changed little, behavior patterns had, 
which made it possible that the change in perception would fol- 
low. 49 
Such legislation and enforcement represented creative reform. 
The increase in the liberty of blacks led to an alteration in their 
perception of themselves and the possibilities in their community. 
The reform created new possibilities of change. A vote and better 
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schools can open out the old self-defeating perspective to a new 
vision of life's potential. There follows a new belief in one's worth 
as an i n d i ~ i d u a l . ' ~  
The direct path to this achievement of partial justice was cre- 
ative reform through politics. This path was not the only one, 
however. In the distant background was the teaching of the Chris- 
tian church on the meaning of the life of everyone for whom Christ 
died. Behind the civil rights legislation was the powerful witness 
of those who had laid down their bodies and even their lives in 
noncooperation with evil. And behind those witnesses were com- 
munities which sustained them. 
These paths came together to provide a road to justice. I t  is a 
road which can most easily be followed by those who at the begin- 
ning meet One who gives them in place of oppression a yoke that 
is easy and a burden that is light. 
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